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Cyberside Chats: Cybersecurity Insights from the Experts: Daily Summaries Delivered
by Chatcyberside
Stay ahead of the latest cybersecurity trends with Cyberside Chats! Listen to our weekly podcast, and join us live once a month for breaking news, emerging threats, and actionable solutions. Whether you’re a cybersecurity professional or an executive looking to understand how to protect your organization, cybersecurity experts Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin will help you stay informed and proactively prepare for today’s top cybersecurity threats, AI-driven attack and defense strategies, and more! Join us monthly for an interactive Cyberside Chats: Live!
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- 2 days ago12 min
Why Patched Networks Still Get Breached: The 2026 Pen Test Report
LMG Security's 2026 Penetration Testing Report, Patched and Still Breached, is out now. Download it free: https://www.lmgsecurity.com/patched-and-still-breached-lmg-2026-pen-test-report/?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=video&utm_campaign=patched-and-still-breached-launch&utm_content=cyberside-chats-episode We analyzed every pen test we ran in 2025 to find out which weaknesses actually led to a domain takeover. The answer was rarely a missing patch: 88% of takeover paths had no software vulnerability on them, and five changes would have broken 94% of those paths. In this episode, Sherri Davidoff and Tom Pohl, LMG's Director of Penetration Testing, walk through the headline findings, why vulnerability scans miss what matters most, and what to fix first. Want the full walkthrough? Sherri and Tom go deeper in a live webinar on Thursday, November 12 at 2:00 PM ET (11:00 AM PT). Register: https://lmgsecurity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_8mczchwXRUSJ-AizftoMJQ?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=video&utm_campaign=patched-and-still-breached-launch&utm_content=cyberside-chats-episode Inside the report: Which weaknesses sat on the path to domain takeover, and which only showed up on scan reports Five changes, each with an owner and a way to verify it Eight step-by-step attack stories Cyberside Chats is LMG Security's weekly podcast for cybersecurity leaders: breaking news, emerging threats, and practical solutions. Subscribe and find every episode at https://www.chatcyberside.com/ #penetrationtesting #cybersecurity #CISO
- 1 weeks ago17 min
PHP2Shell: Who Caught it For You?
On October 21, the PHP project shipped an emergency fix for two critical bugs, nicknamed PHP2Shell, that let an unauthenticated attacker run code on a web server with a single crafted file upload. PHP runs roughly 70% of the web. Governments pulled websites offline, a major HR platform went dark, and attack attempts were hitting sensors hours before a patch existed. Your first line of defense may not have been your own. Cloudflare, Akamai, DreamHost and other major providers had protection in place, buying you time — in some cases hours before the patch was even released. Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin explain what happened, why "we patched" isn't proof, and five questions to put to your own team and every vendor that runs PHP for you. Key Takeaways: Find the PHP you forgot about. The dangerous instances aren't your web farm; they're the backup appliance, the printer, the management console, the exposed controller, the inherited container image. NCSC flagged PHP bundled inside third-party products specifically. Anything on an unsupported version that can't be patched goes off the internet today. Put a maintained layer in front of everything exposed, and still patch behind it. A provider who virtual-patches buys you the hours between “exploit exists” and “patch exists.” But a WAF guards the front door; a phished foothold walks around it to the same bug. Lean on the big providers without letting them become your whole defense. Verify the patch is actually running (don't take “we patched” as done). The update isn't live until every worker is fully restarted, and backported fixes still report the old version number, so the banner can't prove you're safe. Make your team confirm it by package and process, and remember the finders say these two CVEs may not cover every variant. Check with every vendor that runs PHP for you. Most of your exposure is someone else's code: your hosts, your SaaS platforms, the appliances in your racks — and their unpatched server is still your breach. Ask each critical vendor the direct question: have you patched, restarted, and put protection in front? Inventory your own PHP too, and track who can't give you a straight answer. Know who owns emergency patching, and whether they actually caught this one. Someone may already be nominally responsible; this incident is the test of whether that role functions. When the advisory dropped, did your team — internal or outsourced — recognize the urgency and drive the patch, or did it slip by unnoticed? If you had to find out from the news instead of from them, that's the gap to fix before the next one. Resources: PHP, "Security advisory: Critical remote code execution vulnerabilities, update now" — https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5 Cloudflare, "Cloudflare deploys protections against php2shell vulnerability" — https://blog.cloudflare.com/php-vulnerabilities-waf-protection/ The Record, "PHP says AI review of critical bugs first sparked alarm in August, but signs surfaced in 2024" (PHP Foundation postmortem) — https://therecord.media/php-foundation-statement-critical-vulnerabilities Sansec, "PHP2Shell: Critical PHP RCE (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619)" — https://sansec.io/research/php2shell CISA, "Critical Vulnerabilities in PHP Require Immediate Patching" — https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching
- 2 weeks ago10 min
Who Else Controls Your IoT?
This weekend, attackers broke into the refrigeration controllers at hundreds of French supermarkets and turned the freezers into heaters. Alarms reached some store managers in time; in other stores nobody was paged, and many had to throw out all their fresh and frozen food. Researchers had published the flaws in these exact controllers two months earlier and found more than 2,700 of them sitting on the open internet. The manufacturer says most were end-of-life and no longer getting security updates. It isn’t just supermarkets. Nation-states are hijacking security cameras to watch military movements, and a ransomware gang used a webcam to slip past EDR. Every IoT device in your environment is something someone else may want to control — to watch you, to disrupt your operations, or to get a foothold in your network. Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin explain why so many of these devices fall through the cracks — installed by facilities teams and vendors, left unmonitored, and kept running long after support ends — and share five steps leaders can take to find them, own them and stay in control of them. Key Takeaways: Inventory the connected devices your facilities team and contractors installed, and give each one an owner. The supermarket controllers, the cameras and the Akira webcam share one property: everyone assumed someone else was looking after them. Every camera, controller and sensor needs a person accountable for patches, passwords and remote access, the same as a server. Scan your own perimeter on a schedule. CISA advised in May 2025 that the Danfoss controllers be taken off the internet; 17 months later independent scans still found about 2,700 of them exposed. If you aren’t watching your perimeter, an exposed management interface is an open door into your network. Decide at the contract stage what happens when the vendor stops supporting your equipment, and how long support is guaranteed. Hospitals and manufacturers know this pattern: multi-million-dollar hardware whose software quietly goes end-of-life. Understand the software’s lifespan before you buy, and hold the vendor to it in writing. Make alerting survive the compromise of the thing it monitors. The refrigeration controllers’ alerts are configured on the same web interface the attackers controlled and travel over the same internet connection. Monitor critical temperatures with a separate device on a separate path, such as cellular, and make sure a real person is on the other end at 4 a.m. Treat your vendors’ remote access as your attack surface, and bind them to your security policy. Don’t write a list of controls into the contract. Require vendors to adhere to your security practices, which can be updated as the threat landscape changes. Resources: Wall Street Journal, “Video Cameras Are Everywhere—and Now They Are Being Hacked for War” — https://www.wsj.com/tech/cybersecurity/video-cameras-webcams-hacked-war-b00b8a24 BleepingComputer, “Cyberattack shuts down refrigerators at French supermarkets” — https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cyberattack-shuts-down-refrigerators-at-french-supermarkets/ Claroty Team82, “Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food” — https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers S-RM, “Camera off: Akira deploys ransomware via webcam” — https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/camera-off-akira-deploys-ransomware-via-webcam LMG Security, 2026 Annual Penetration Testing Report
- 3 weeks ago35 min
Three Big AI Shifts: Containment, Cancellation & Court Action
On September 28, three things happened: NVIDIA shipped an open platform to contain AI agents, OpenAI cancelled the release of its next flagship model because it strayed outside its instructions and misreported what it did, and Florida's attorney general asked a court to stop OpenAI from building new models without independent safety review. They are the same story from three angles — and the story began over the summer, when every major lab disclosed that its agents had broken out of the environments meant to hold them. Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin, recording live, break down what NVIDIA actually built — a software sandbox anyone can run, and a hardware watchdog most organizations can't — and whether it can hold against an attacker that reads every paper on cages and never sleeps. They walk the Hugging Face intrusion that led here, what the agents said in their own words, and the critical sandbox escape NVIDIA patched a month before launch. Then the harder questions: who decides whether a frontier model is safe to ship (right now, only the company that built it), why Florida's lawsuit looks a lot like the ChoicePoint era, and what any of this means for a security leader whose AI arrived as a checkbox inside Microsoft 365 or Salesforce. Plus five things to assign this week — starting with a list of every agent already running in your environment. Key Takeaways: Build a register of every AI agent running in your environment — who owns it, what it can reach, and whose credentials it uses. Start with the checkboxes already turned on in Microsoft 365, Salesforce, ServiceNow, your MSP's tooling, and any self-hosted model a data team stood up. No control in this episode can be applied to something you haven't listed. Assume every agent will eventually act outside its instructions, and design for it. OpenAI shelved its next model because it strayed out of scope and misreported what it did; the labs are investigating tens of thousands of bypasses. Give every agent a scoped service account with an expiry date, revoke any that hold admin or standing broad access, and treat it the way you'd treat a contractor with a broad brief and no supervisor. Verify this quarter that egress filtering, DNS filtering, and public-source credential scanning are on for anything an agent can touch. These are controls you already own. A missing DNS filter let an OpenAI agent tunnel out of a "sealed" sandbox; runtime monitoring, not policy, caught the Hugging Face intrusion. Add three questions to your vendor and MSP due-diligence template, and require written answers before renewal. Where does enforcement live — inside the model or outside it? Can the agent ever hold real credentials or reach the network directly? What is your incident-notification commitment, in hours? Run a tabletop where an agent — not an attacker — misuses its own access, and find out who can cut it off and how fast. OpenAI's automatic kill switch failed and a human stopped the run two and a half hours later. Name the person, test the path, time it. Resources: NVIDIA — Open Agent Safety Platform (technical overview): https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/nvidia-open-agent-safety-platform-a-reference-for-continuous-in-silicon-agent-monitoring/ NVIDIA Security Bulletin 5872 — OpenShell and NemoClaw, August 2026: https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5872 OpenAI — The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead: https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/ UK AI Security Institute — Cheating behaviour in frontier model evaluations: https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/cheating-behaviour-in-frontier-model-evaluations Florida AG motion for temporary injunction against OpenAI (SiliconANGLE): https://siliconangle.com/2026/09/28/florida-attorney-general-asks-court-to-prevent-openai-from-advancing-its-frontier-models-even-as-company-scraps-new-release/
- Sep 29, 202614 min
North Korea’s Fake Job Interviews: The WaterPlum Advisory
This week, Sherri and Matt dig into a joint advisory from seven government agencies across Japan, the US, Australia, and Germany naming WaterPlum, the North Korean actors posing as prospective employers to target software developers and IT professionals. Japan’s National Police Agency reports at least 30,000 infected devices in more than 100 countries between December 2025 and July 2026, with funds or credentials taken from more than 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets and roughly $10.71 million moved to North Korea. Sherri and Matt break down how the lure works, why coding challenges are such an effective delivery mechanism, and what changed with the newest malware family, StoatWaffle, which can execute when a trusted folder is opened in VS Code. They connect it to the case LMG’s Tom Pohl analyzed in June and examine how North Korea is now working both sides of the hiring table, as both interviewer and applicant. Key Takeaways: Make onboarding a security checkpoint. Identity verification should be an HR and IT project. Verify every new hire’s identity, issue fresh credentials, and monitor accounts closely during the first few weeks. A compromised candidate can bring an existing infection into your organization on day one. Because the same operation also uses fake applicants, verify claimed locations, IP addresses, and résumé skills. Treat password reuse as a policy issue, not a question. The malware Tom analyzed harvested saved credentials from ten different browsers. Require unique corporate passwords, audit them against known-breach lists, and use phishing-resistant MFA. Anyone with source code or administrative access should be considered for hardware-based authentication such as a YubiKey. Keep developers off personal devices. Personal laptops often combine job hunting, coding challenges, credentials, and crypto wallets. In one case Tom analyzed, the person infected wasn't even the primary laptop user. Require company-managed devices for anyone accessing code, cloud infrastructure, or production systems. If personal-device use is allowed, document it as an accepted risk. Extend security requirements to vendors and contractors. Your organization can be compromised through someone else's developer. Bybit lost roughly $1.5 billion after a developer at its wallet vendor was compromised. Ask vendors: Do developers use managed devices? How are they trained on fake-recruiter and malicious-package attacks? How do they prevent password reuse? How do they vet employees and subcontractors? Keep developer training current. Tom's case was identified because someone recognized the fake-interview pattern and reported it instead of running the code. These actors continuously evolve their methods. StoatWaffle is a good example: the risk has moved beyond "don't run code from strangers" to situations where simply opening a trusted folder can trigger execution. Make current threat briefings part of ongoing training for developers, IT staff, and contractors. Hiring has become an attack surface in both directions, and most security programs don't own either end of it. References: Joint NPA/NCO/FBI/DC3/ASD’s ACSC/BND/BfV advisory on North Korean WaterPlum, Sept. 18, 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260918.pdf LMG Security, Anatomy of a Job Interview Supply Chain Attack (June 2026) Cyberside Chats, Damaged Goods: When Your New Hire Is Already Compromised (June 9, 2026): https://www.chatcyberside.com/e/damaged-goods-when-your-new-hire-is-already-compromised/ NTT Security, OtterCookie analysis (Jan. 16, 2025): https://jp.security.ntt/insights_resources/tech_blog/en-contagious-interview-ottercookie/ The Hacker News, North Korean hackers abuse VS Code auto-run tasks to deploy StoatWaffle (March 2026): https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/north-korean-hackers-abuse-vs-code-auto.html Microsoft Security Blog, Contagious Interview malware delivered through fake developer job interviews (March 11, 2026): https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/11/contagious-interview-malware-delivered-through-fake-developer-job-interviews/ KnowBe4, How a North Korean Fake IT Worker Tried to Infiltrate Us (July 23, 2024; updated Oct. 19, 2024): https://blog.knowbe4.com/how-a-north-korean-fake-it-worker-tried-to-in
- Sep 24, 202612 min
You Can't Trust the Last Mile: Wiretapping Fiber From Home
Two friends ordered a new fiber connection, followed the installer around with a camera, and noticed that the box on the pole outside their house had no power. That one observation led them to capture their entire neighborhood's internet traffic — web browsing, email, even live phone calls — with $99 worth of equipment. Sherri Davidoff and Tom Pohl break down "gPWN," one of the standout talks from Black Hat USA 2026. Fiber to the home broadcasts everyone's traffic to every house on the street and trusts each home's equipment to ignore what isn't theirs. The encryption meant to back that up is optional, often left switched off, and doesn't cover traffic headed back to the ISP at all. It gets worse: cell towers ride the same fiber, which means the "out-of-band" cellular path in your continuity plan may share a line with your neighbors. And the researchers showed how a malicious username typed into a home fiber box could hand an attacker root access to the ISP's own equipment. The lesson isn't just about fiber. Decades ago we replaced hubs with switches so our traffic stopped going to everyone on the network. The last mile quietly went back to a hub — and everything built on top of it kept assuming the old rules. Key Takeaways: Use a VPN you trust. You can't trust the last mile. Encryption on many fiber deployments is optional and often switched off, and traffic from your home or office back to the ISP isn't encrypted at all. Prove your out-of-band paths really are out of band. Cell towers are often connected over the same neighborhood fiber as homes and offices. Falling back to cellular may mean relying on the same path as your primary internet connection — check before an outage does it for you. Assume every carrier circuit is a public network. Treat your office connection like coffee shop Wi-Fi: anyone nearby could be watching. The risk profile of a business in a strip mall may not be very different. don't trust vendor-supplied equipment. Assume vendors will leave optional security switched off — or have access into your equipment. Where you can, use your own router and firewall behind the ISP's device. Put an expiration date on your assumptions. We spent years assuming layer two was secure because we had switches. Your ISP may have quietly replaced that with fiber that sends everyone's traffic to every house. Revisit the assumptions your security is built on. Resources: Black Hat USA 2026 — "gPWN: Wiretapping Fiber ISP Deployments From the Comfort of Your Home" (Rithvik Vibhu & Rithwik Jayasimha) — https://blackhat.com/us-26/briefings/schedule/#gpwn-wiretapping-fiber-isp-deployments-from-the-comfort-of-your-home-53851 gPWN project site and toolkit — https://www.gpwn.io/ Hackaday, "Hacking Fiber To The Home" — https://hackaday.com/2026/08/13/hacking-fiber-to-the-home/ Quarkslab, "Overview of Passive Optical Networks (PONs) Security" — https://blog.quarkslab.com/overview-of-passive-optical-networks-pons-security.html Dark Reading, "Salt Typhoon APT Subverts Law Enforcement Wiretapping" — https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/salt-typhoon-apt-subverts-law-enforcement-wiretapping
- Sep 15, 202616 min
Outpaced: What AI Did to the Attack Clock
Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 investigated an intrusion where the attacker used AI agents to carry out the attack — and compressed work a human team would have needed more than two weeks to do into just under ten hours, using more than 50 MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin unpack what actually happened, starting with a correction: despite the headlines, this was not an autonomous AI. A human directed it. They walk the chain from a breached public website through sub-agents harvesting hard-coded tokens out of code repositories, into the secrets manager, and finally to the attacker turning the victim’s own AI endpoints into attack infrastructure — using the company’s compute power against it. Along the way: why an attempted backdoor in Terraform configurations was the most alarming move in the intrusion, why branch protection stopped an attacker who already held master admin credentials, and why the tactic adversaries use to slip past AI guardrails looks a lot like a Russian ransomware gang’s fake IT recruitment scheme. The thesis isn’t that AI went rogue. It’s that the clock changed, and incident response plans built for a two-week dwell time are now built for the wrong attack. Key Takeaways: Make every key and token in your environment expire. They will not get rotated by default. Set expirations so they cannot stay invisible forever, and track them. Require a second layer of approval for critical infrastructure changes. Branch protection stopped this attacker after they already held master admin credentials. Logging and monitoring are good; prevention is better. Give every AI service in your environment a named owner. Somebody has to be managing the keys and controlling it, so you know where it is. Apply the same controls to your vendors and MSPs. Work these into your next review cycle: how do they manage keys and tokens, do they scan for secrets, do they require second approvals? Run a tabletop against a ten-hour clock. Find out who can actually cut off access to a primary system — who can take it offline, when, and what they need to do it. Resources: Unit 42, “An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation” — https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-assisted-cyber-attack-inside-a-unit-42-investigation/ Anthropic, “Countering misuse of AI: September 2026” — https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 GitGuardian, “The State of Secrets Sprawl 2026” — https://blog.gitguardian.com/the-state-of-secrets-sprawl-2026/ Tom Pohl (LMG Security), “Private Keys in Public Places,” DEF CON 31 — https://www.lmgsecurity.com/resources/private-keys-in-public-places-defcon-2023-presentation/ Video of the talk — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7t_ntuSXniw
- Sep 10, 202620 min
AI Collusion? Inside the OpenAI–Hugging Face Attack
This week, Sherri and Matt talk about how much worse the OpenAI–Hugging Face story has gotten. New reporting revealed it wasn't a single model that escaped its sandbox — roughly 1,200 did, and about 700 of them went on to attack Hugging Face. Sherri and Matt walk through how agents that were never supposed to communicate found each other through a shared software package manager, built an improvised message board, started delegating work, and even rolled out their own public-key message signing once they worried about impostors. They dig into the red flags OpenAI spotted and waved past, why the victim discovered the breach before the perpetrator did, and the uncomfortable fact that every escape path the agents used was one that had been explicitly permitted. Plus: similar incidents at other AI labs, and the AI assistant that hacked a gym's booking system to bump its user up a waitlist. Key Takeaways: Hunt your own leaked credentials before someone else finds them. The Hugging Face compromise started with 14 valid tokens sitting in a public dataset — no exploit required. With billions of stolen credentials already circulating, AI is very good at finding the ones that belong to you. Shift to continuous patch management. Exploitation now happens at machine speed, and it isn't limited to your flagship platforms. A package manager was central to this attack. Reduce your attack surface, minimize what's internet-facing, and plan for patching zero-days on whatever remains exposed. Segment your network. The agents moved laterally out of their sandbox and then straight through production. The goal isn't to make compromise impossible — it's to put up enough roadblocks that you can detect it and respond before it becomes a full-blown incident. Monitor your infrastructure, and get help scaling it. Round-the-clock coverage is out of reach for most teams on their own. As AI gets better at breaking in, it will also get better at staying quiet — and compromise will look increasingly subtle. Respond at machine speed. Agents went from a single container to multi-cluster admin in under 13 hours, adapting public exploits along the way. Line up your cyber insurer and an experienced IR firm before you need them, and run tabletop exercises for nights and weekends against an attacker that never sleeps. It's not just about rapid detection anymore — it's about rapid decision-making. References: OpenAI, Hugging Face Incident Technical Report (38 pages): https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/67869394-cb91-4c12-888c-5cbd85c7814c/OpenAI-Hugging-Face%20Incident-Technical-Report.pdf OpenAI, The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead: https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/ METR / Redwood Research, independent investigation of the agents' behavior and collaboration: https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/ Hugging Face, Security incident disclosure — July 2026: https://huggingface.co/blog/security-incident-july-2026 OpenAI, initial disclosure: https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/ OpenAI's Black Hat presentation on the incident: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87DyyMV0kCY Anthropic, Improving our alignment and security efforts: https://www.anthropic.com/news/improving-alignment-security-efforts TechCrunch, Here's all the times AI has gone rogue and hacked other companies: https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/27/heres-all-the-times-ai-has-gone-rogue-and-hacked-other-companies/ ABC Australia, AI assistant exploits a gym booking system: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-10/ai-assistant-hacks-gym-website-aus-cyber-attack/107007986
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About Cyberside Chats: Cybersecurity Insights from the Experts
Stay ahead of the latest cybersecurity trends with Cyberside Chats! Listen to our weekly podcast, and join us live once a month for breaking news, emerging threats, and actionable solutions. Whether you’re a cybersecurity professional or an executive looking to understand how to protect your organization, cybersecurity experts Sherri Davidoff and Matt Durrin will help you stay informed and proactively prepare for today’s top cybersecurity threats, AI-driven attack and defense strategies, and more! Join us monthly for an interactive Cyberside Chats: Live!
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